Initial commit

.venv/Lib/site-packages/jose/backends/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+try:
+    from jose.backends.cryptography_backend import get_random_bytes  # noqa: F401
+except ImportError:
+    try:
+        from jose.backends.pycrypto_backend import get_random_bytes  # noqa: F401
+    except ImportError:
+        from jose.backends.native import get_random_bytes  # noqa: F401
+
+try:
+    from jose.backends.cryptography_backend import CryptographyRSAKey as RSAKey  # noqa: F401
+except ImportError:
+    try:
+        from jose.backends.rsa_backend import RSAKey  # noqa: F401
+    except ImportError:
+        RSAKey = None
+
+try:
+    from jose.backends.cryptography_backend import CryptographyECKey as ECKey  # noqa: F401
+except ImportError:
+    from jose.backends.ecdsa_backend import ECDSAECKey as ECKey  # noqa: F401
+
+try:
+    from jose.backends.cryptography_backend import CryptographyAESKey as AESKey  # noqa: F401
+except ImportError:
+    AESKey = None
+
+try:
+    from jose.backends.cryptography_backend import CryptographyHMACKey as HMACKey  # noqa: F401
+except ImportError:
+    from jose.backends.native import HMACKey  # noqa: F401
+
+from .base import DIRKey  # noqa: F401

.venv/Lib/site-packages/jose/backends/_asn1.py

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+"""ASN1 encoding helpers for converting between PKCS1 and PKCS8.
+
+Required by rsa_backend but not cryptography_backend.
+"""
+from pyasn1.codec.der import decoder, encoder
+from pyasn1.type import namedtype, univ
+
+RSA_ENCRYPTION_ASN1_OID = "1.2.840.113549.1.1.1"
+
+
+class RsaAlgorithmIdentifier(univ.Sequence):
+    """ASN1 structure for recording RSA PrivateKeyAlgorithm identifiers."""
+
+    componentType = namedtype.NamedTypes(
+        namedtype.NamedType("rsaEncryption", univ.ObjectIdentifier()), namedtype.NamedType("parameters", univ.Null())
+    )
+
+
+class PKCS8PrivateKey(univ.Sequence):
+    """ASN1 structure for recording PKCS8 private keys."""
+
+    componentType = namedtype.NamedTypes(
+        namedtype.NamedType("version", univ.Integer()),
+        namedtype.NamedType("privateKeyAlgorithm", RsaAlgorithmIdentifier()),
+        namedtype.NamedType("privateKey", univ.OctetString()),
+    )
+
+
+class PublicKeyInfo(univ.Sequence):
+    """ASN1 structure for recording PKCS8 public keys."""
+
+    componentType = namedtype.NamedTypes(
+        namedtype.NamedType("algorithm", RsaAlgorithmIdentifier()), namedtype.NamedType("publicKey", univ.BitString())
+    )
+
+
+def rsa_private_key_pkcs8_to_pkcs1(pkcs8_key):
+    """Convert a PKCS8-encoded RSA private key to PKCS1."""
+    decoded_values = decoder.decode(pkcs8_key, asn1Spec=PKCS8PrivateKey())
+
+    try:
+        decoded_key = decoded_values[0]
+    except IndexError:
+        raise ValueError("Invalid private key encoding")
+
+    return decoded_key["privateKey"]
+
+
+def rsa_private_key_pkcs1_to_pkcs8(pkcs1_key):
+    """Convert a PKCS1-encoded RSA private key to PKCS8."""
+    algorithm = RsaAlgorithmIdentifier()
+    algorithm["rsaEncryption"] = RSA_ENCRYPTION_ASN1_OID
+
+    pkcs8_key = PKCS8PrivateKey()
+    pkcs8_key["version"] = 0
+    pkcs8_key["privateKeyAlgorithm"] = algorithm
+    pkcs8_key["privateKey"] = pkcs1_key
+
+    return encoder.encode(pkcs8_key)
+
+
+def rsa_public_key_pkcs1_to_pkcs8(pkcs1_key):
+    """Convert a PKCS1-encoded RSA private key to PKCS8."""
+    algorithm = RsaAlgorithmIdentifier()
+    algorithm["rsaEncryption"] = RSA_ENCRYPTION_ASN1_OID
+
+    pkcs8_key = PublicKeyInfo()
+    pkcs8_key["algorithm"] = algorithm
+    pkcs8_key["publicKey"] = univ.BitString.fromOctetString(pkcs1_key)
+
+    return encoder.encode(pkcs8_key)
+
+
+def rsa_public_key_pkcs8_to_pkcs1(pkcs8_key):
+    """Convert a PKCS8-encoded RSA private key to PKCS1."""
+    decoded_values = decoder.decode(pkcs8_key, asn1Spec=PublicKeyInfo())
+
+    try:
+        decoded_key = decoded_values[0]
+    except IndexError:
+        raise ValueError("Invalid public key encoding.")
+
+    return decoded_key["publicKey"].asOctets()

.venv/Lib/site-packages/jose/backends/base.py

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+from ..utils import base64url_encode, ensure_binary
+
+
+class Key:
+    """
+    A simple interface for implementing JWK keys.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, key, algorithm):
+        pass
+
+    def sign(self, msg):
+        raise NotImplementedError()
+
+    def verify(self, msg, sig):
+        raise NotImplementedError()
+
+    def public_key(self):
+        raise NotImplementedError()
+
+    def to_pem(self):
+        raise NotImplementedError()
+
+    def to_dict(self):
+        raise NotImplementedError()
+
+    def encrypt(self, plain_text, aad=None):
+        """
+        Encrypt the plain text and generate an auth tag if appropriate
+
+        Args:
+            plain_text (bytes): Data to encrypt
+            aad (bytes, optional): Authenticated Additional Data if key's algorithm supports auth mode
+
+        Returns:
+            (bytes, bytes, bytes): IV, cipher text, and auth tag
+        """
+        raise NotImplementedError()
+
+    def decrypt(self, cipher_text, iv=None, aad=None, tag=None):
+        """
+        Decrypt the cipher text and validate the auth tag if present
+        Args:
+            cipher_text (bytes): Cipher text to decrypt
+            iv (bytes): IV if block mode
+            aad (bytes): Additional Authenticated Data to verify if auth mode
+            tag (bytes): Authentication tag if auth mode
+
+        Returns:
+            bytes: Decrypted value
+        """
+        raise NotImplementedError()
+
+    def wrap_key(self, key_data):
+        """
+        Wrap the the plain text key data
+
+        Args:
+            key_data (bytes): Key data to wrap
+
+        Returns:
+            bytes: Wrapped key
+        """
+        raise NotImplementedError()
+
+    def unwrap_key(self, wrapped_key):
+        """
+        Unwrap the the wrapped key data
+
+        Args:
+            wrapped_key (bytes): Wrapped key data to unwrap
+
+        Returns:
+            bytes: Unwrapped key
+        """
+        raise NotImplementedError()
+
+
+class DIRKey(Key):
+    def __init__(self, key_data, algorithm):
+        self._key = ensure_binary(key_data)
+        self._alg = algorithm
+
+    def to_dict(self):
+        return {
+            "alg": self._alg,
+            "kty": "oct",
+            "k": base64url_encode(self._key),
+        }

.venv/Lib/site-packages/jose/backends/cryptography_backend.py

@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+import math
+import warnings
+
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature, InvalidTag
+from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
+from cryptography.hazmat.bindings.openssl.binding import Binding
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, hmac, serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, padding, rsa
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.utils import decode_dss_signature, encode_dss_signature
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, aead, algorithms, modes
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.keywrap import InvalidUnwrap, aes_key_unwrap, aes_key_wrap
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.padding import PKCS7
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import load_pem_private_key, load_pem_public_key
+from cryptography.utils import int_to_bytes
+from cryptography.x509 import load_pem_x509_certificate
+
+from ..constants import ALGORITHMS
+from ..exceptions import JWEError, JWKError
+from ..utils import base64_to_long, base64url_decode, base64url_encode, ensure_binary, long_to_base64
+from .base import Key
+
+_binding = None
+
+
+def get_random_bytes(num_bytes):
+    """
+    Get random bytes
+
+    Currently, Cryptography returns OS random bytes. If you want OpenSSL
+    generated random bytes, you'll have to switch the RAND engine after
+    initializing the OpenSSL backend
+    Args:
+        num_bytes (int): Number of random bytes to generate and return
+    Returns:
+        bytes: Random bytes
+    """
+    global _binding
+
+    if _binding is None:
+        _binding = Binding()
+
+    buf = _binding.ffi.new("char[]", num_bytes)
+    _binding.lib.RAND_bytes(buf, num_bytes)
+    rand_bytes = _binding.ffi.buffer(buf, num_bytes)[:]
+    return rand_bytes
+
+
+class CryptographyECKey(Key):
+    SHA256 = hashes.SHA256
+    SHA384 = hashes.SHA384
+    SHA512 = hashes.SHA512
+
+    def __init__(self, key, algorithm, cryptography_backend=default_backend):
+        if algorithm not in ALGORITHMS.EC:
+            raise JWKError("hash_alg: %s is not a valid hash algorithm" % algorithm)
+
+        self.hash_alg = {
+            ALGORITHMS.ES256: self.SHA256,
+            ALGORITHMS.ES384: self.SHA384,
+            ALGORITHMS.ES512: self.SHA512,
+        }.get(algorithm)
+        self._algorithm = algorithm
+
+        self.cryptography_backend = cryptography_backend
+
+        if hasattr(key, "public_bytes") or hasattr(key, "private_bytes"):
+            self.prepared_key = key
+            return
+
+        if hasattr(key, "to_pem"):
+            # convert to PEM and let cryptography below load it as PEM
+            key = key.to_pem().decode("utf-8")
+
+        if isinstance(key, dict):
+            self.prepared_key = self._process_jwk(key)
+            return
+
+        if isinstance(key, str):
+            key = key.encode("utf-8")
+
+        if isinstance(key, bytes):
+            # Attempt to load key. We don't know if it's
+            # a Public Key or a Private Key, so we try
+            # the Public Key first.
+            try:
+                try:
+                    key = load_pem_public_key(key, self.cryptography_backend())
+                except ValueError:
+                    key = load_pem_private_key(key, password=None, backend=self.cryptography_backend())
+            except Exception as e:
+                raise JWKError(e)
+
+            self.prepared_key = key
+            return
+
+        raise JWKError("Unable to parse an ECKey from key: %s" % key)
+
+    def _process_jwk(self, jwk_dict):
+        if not jwk_dict.get("kty") == "EC":
+            raise JWKError("Incorrect key type. Expected: 'EC', Received: %s" % jwk_dict.get("kty"))
+
+        if not all(k in jwk_dict for k in ["x", "y", "crv"]):
+            raise JWKError("Mandatory parameters are missing")
+
+        x = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("x"))
+        y = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("y"))
+        curve = {
+            "P-256": ec.SECP256R1,
+            "P-384": ec.SECP384R1,
+            "P-521": ec.SECP521R1,
+        }[jwk_dict["crv"]]
+
+        public = ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(x, y, curve())
+
+        if "d" in jwk_dict:
+            d = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("d"))
+            private = ec.EllipticCurvePrivateNumbers(d, public)
+
+            return private.private_key(self.cryptography_backend())
+        else:
+            return public.public_key(self.cryptography_backend())
+
+    def _sig_component_length(self):
+        """Determine the correct serialization length for an encoded signature component.
+
+        This is the number of bytes required to encode the maximum key value.
+        """
+        return int(math.ceil(self.prepared_key.key_size / 8.0))
+
+    def _der_to_raw(self, der_signature):
+        """Convert signature from DER encoding to RAW encoding."""
+        r, s = decode_dss_signature(der_signature)
+        component_length = self._sig_component_length()
+        return int_to_bytes(r, component_length) + int_to_bytes(s, component_length)
+
+    def _raw_to_der(self, raw_signature):
+        """Convert signature from RAW encoding to DER encoding."""
+        component_length = self._sig_component_length()
+        if len(raw_signature) != int(2 * component_length):
+            raise ValueError("Invalid signature")
+
+        r_bytes = raw_signature[:component_length]
+        s_bytes = raw_signature[component_length:]
+        r = int.from_bytes(r_bytes, "big")
+        s = int.from_bytes(s_bytes, "big")
+        return encode_dss_signature(r, s)
+
+    def sign(self, msg):
+        if self.hash_alg.digest_size * 8 > self.prepared_key.curve.key_size:
+            raise TypeError(
+                "this curve (%s) is too short "
+                "for your digest (%d)" % (self.prepared_key.curve.name, 8 * self.hash_alg.digest_size)
+            )
+        signature = self.prepared_key.sign(msg, ec.ECDSA(self.hash_alg()))
+        return self._der_to_raw(signature)
+
+    def verify(self, msg, sig):
+        try:
+            signature = self._raw_to_der(sig)
+            self.prepared_key.verify(signature, msg, ec.ECDSA(self.hash_alg()))
+            return True
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+
+    def is_public(self):
+        return hasattr(self.prepared_key, "public_bytes")
+
+    def public_key(self):
+        if self.is_public():
+            return self
+        return self.__class__(self.prepared_key.public_key(), self._algorithm)
+
+    def to_pem(self):
+        if self.is_public():
+            pem = self.prepared_key.public_bytes(
+                encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM, format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+            )
+            return pem
+        pem = self.prepared_key.private_bytes(
+            encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+            format=serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,
+            encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
+        )
+        return pem
+
+    def to_dict(self):
+        if not self.is_public():
+            public_key = self.prepared_key.public_key()
+        else:
+            public_key = self.prepared_key
+
+        crv = {
+            "secp256r1": "P-256",
+            "secp384r1": "P-384",
+            "secp521r1": "P-521",
+        }[self.prepared_key.curve.name]
+
+        # Calculate the key size in bytes. Section 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.1.3 of
+        # RFC7518 prescribes that the 'x', 'y' and 'd' parameters of the curve
+        # points must be encoded as octed-strings of this length.
+        key_size = (self.prepared_key.curve.key_size + 7) // 8
+
+        data = {
+            "alg": self._algorithm,
+            "kty": "EC",
+            "crv": crv,
+            "x": long_to_base64(public_key.public_numbers().x, size=key_size).decode("ASCII"),
+            "y": long_to_base64(public_key.public_numbers().y, size=key_size).decode("ASCII"),
+        }
+
+        if not self.is_public():
+            private_value = self.prepared_key.private_numbers().private_value
+            data["d"] = long_to_base64(private_value, size=key_size).decode("ASCII")
+
+        return data
+
+
+class CryptographyRSAKey(Key):
+    SHA256 = hashes.SHA256
+    SHA384 = hashes.SHA384
+    SHA512 = hashes.SHA512
+
+    RSA1_5 = padding.PKCS1v15()
+    RSA_OAEP = padding.OAEP(padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA1()), hashes.SHA1(), None)
+    RSA_OAEP_256 = padding.OAEP(padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()), hashes.SHA256(), None)
+
+    def __init__(self, key, algorithm, cryptography_backend=default_backend):
+        if algorithm not in ALGORITHMS.RSA:
+            raise JWKError("hash_alg: %s is not a valid hash algorithm" % algorithm)
+
+        self.hash_alg = {
+            ALGORITHMS.RS256: self.SHA256,
+            ALGORITHMS.RS384: self.SHA384,
+            ALGORITHMS.RS512: self.SHA512,
+        }.get(algorithm)
+        self._algorithm = algorithm
+
+        self.padding = {
+            ALGORITHMS.RSA1_5: self.RSA1_5,
+            ALGORITHMS.RSA_OAEP: self.RSA_OAEP,
+            ALGORITHMS.RSA_OAEP_256: self.RSA_OAEP_256,
+        }.get(algorithm)
+
+        self.cryptography_backend = cryptography_backend
+
+        # if it conforms to RSAPublicKey interface
+        if hasattr(key, "public_bytes") and hasattr(key, "public_numbers"):
+            self.prepared_key = key
+            return
+
+        if isinstance(key, dict):
+            self.prepared_key = self._process_jwk(key)
+            return
+
+        if isinstance(key, str):
+            key = key.encode("utf-8")
+
+        if isinstance(key, bytes):
+            try:
+                if key.startswith(b"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"):
+                    self._process_cert(key)
+                    return
+
+                try:
+                    self.prepared_key = load_pem_public_key(key, self.cryptography_backend())
+                except ValueError:
+                    self.prepared_key = load_pem_private_key(key, password=None, backend=self.cryptography_backend())
+            except Exception as e:
+                raise JWKError(e)
+            return
+
+        raise JWKError("Unable to parse an RSA_JWK from key: %s" % key)
+
+    def _process_jwk(self, jwk_dict):
+        if not jwk_dict.get("kty") == "RSA":
+            raise JWKError("Incorrect key type. Expected: 'RSA', Received: %s" % jwk_dict.get("kty"))
+
+        e = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("e", 256))
+        n = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("n"))
+        public = rsa.RSAPublicNumbers(e, n)
+
+        if "d" not in jwk_dict:
+            return public.public_key(self.cryptography_backend())
+        else:
+            # This is a private key.
+            d = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("d"))
+
+            extra_params = ["p", "q", "dp", "dq", "qi"]
+
+            if any(k in jwk_dict for k in extra_params):
+                # Precomputed private key parameters are available.
+                if not all(k in jwk_dict for k in extra_params):
+                    # These values must be present when 'p' is according to
+                    # Section 6.3.2 of RFC7518, so if they are not we raise
+                    # an error.
+                    raise JWKError("Precomputed private key parameters are incomplete.")
+
+                p = base64_to_long(jwk_dict["p"])
+                q = base64_to_long(jwk_dict["q"])
+                dp = base64_to_long(jwk_dict["dp"])
+                dq = base64_to_long(jwk_dict["dq"])
+                qi = base64_to_long(jwk_dict["qi"])
+            else:
+                # The precomputed private key parameters are not available,
+                # so we use cryptography's API to fill them in.
+                p, q = rsa.rsa_recover_prime_factors(n, e, d)
+                dp = rsa.rsa_crt_dmp1(d, p)
+                dq = rsa.rsa_crt_dmq1(d, q)
+                qi = rsa.rsa_crt_iqmp(p, q)
+
+            private = rsa.RSAPrivateNumbers(p, q, d, dp, dq, qi, public)
+
+            return private.private_key(self.cryptography_backend())
+
+    def _process_cert(self, key):
+        key = load_pem_x509_certificate(key, self.cryptography_backend())
+        self.prepared_key = key.public_key()
+
+    def sign(self, msg):
+        try:
+            signature = self.prepared_key.sign(msg, padding.PKCS1v15(), self.hash_alg())
+        except Exception as e:
+            raise JWKError(e)
+        return signature
+
+    def verify(self, msg, sig):
+        if not self.is_public():
+            warnings.warn("Attempting to verify a message with a private key. " "This is not recommended.")
+
+        try:
+            self.public_key().prepared_key.verify(sig, msg, padding.PKCS1v15(), self.hash_alg())
+            return True
+        except InvalidSignature:
+            return False
+
+    def is_public(self):
+        return hasattr(self.prepared_key, "public_bytes")
+
+    def public_key(self):
+        if self.is_public():
+            return self
+        return self.__class__(self.prepared_key.public_key(), self._algorithm)
+
+    def to_pem(self, pem_format="PKCS8"):
+        if self.is_public():
+            if pem_format == "PKCS8":
+                fmt = serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+            elif pem_format == "PKCS1":
+                fmt = serialization.PublicFormat.PKCS1
+            else:
+                raise ValueError("Invalid format specified: %r" % pem_format)
+            pem = self.prepared_key.public_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM, format=fmt)
+            return pem
+
+        if pem_format == "PKCS8":
+            fmt = serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8
+        elif pem_format == "PKCS1":
+            fmt = serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL
+        else:
+            raise ValueError("Invalid format specified: %r" % pem_format)
+
+        return self.prepared_key.private_bytes(
+            encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM, format=fmt, encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption()
+        )
+
+    def to_dict(self):
+        if not self.is_public():
+            public_key = self.prepared_key.public_key()
+        else:
+            public_key = self.prepared_key
+
+        data = {
+            "alg": self._algorithm,
+            "kty": "RSA",
+            "n": long_to_base64(public_key.public_numbers().n).decode("ASCII"),
+            "e": long_to_base64(public_key.public_numbers().e).decode("ASCII"),
+        }
+
+        if not self.is_public():
+            data.update(
+                {
+                    "d": long_to_base64(self.prepared_key.private_numbers().d).decode("ASCII"),
+                    "p": long_to_base64(self.prepared_key.private_numbers().p).decode("ASCII"),
+                    "q": long_to_base64(self.prepared_key.private_numbers().q).decode("ASCII"),
+                    "dp": long_to_base64(self.prepared_key.private_numbers().dmp1).decode("ASCII"),
+                    "dq": long_to_base64(self.prepared_key.private_numbers().dmq1).decode("ASCII"),
+                    "qi": long_to_base64(self.prepared_key.private_numbers().iqmp).decode("ASCII"),
+                }
+            )
+
+        return data
+
+    def wrap_key(self, key_data):
+        try:
+            wrapped_key = self.prepared_key.encrypt(key_data, self.padding)
+        except Exception as e:
+            raise JWEError(e)
+
+        return wrapped_key
+
+    def unwrap_key(self, wrapped_key):
+        try:
+            unwrapped_key = self.prepared_key.decrypt(wrapped_key, self.padding)
+            return unwrapped_key
+        except Exception as e:
+            raise JWEError(e)
+
+
+class CryptographyAESKey(Key):
+    KEY_128 = (ALGORITHMS.A128GCM, ALGORITHMS.A128GCMKW, ALGORITHMS.A128KW, ALGORITHMS.A128CBC)
+    KEY_192 = (ALGORITHMS.A192GCM, ALGORITHMS.A192GCMKW, ALGORITHMS.A192KW, ALGORITHMS.A192CBC)
+    KEY_256 = (
+        ALGORITHMS.A256GCM,
+        ALGORITHMS.A256GCMKW,
+        ALGORITHMS.A256KW,
+        ALGORITHMS.A128CBC_HS256,
+        ALGORITHMS.A256CBC,
+    )
+    KEY_384 = (ALGORITHMS.A192CBC_HS384,)
+    KEY_512 = (ALGORITHMS.A256CBC_HS512,)
+
+    AES_KW_ALGS = (ALGORITHMS.A128KW, ALGORITHMS.A192KW, ALGORITHMS.A256KW)
+
+    MODES = {
+        ALGORITHMS.A128GCM: modes.GCM,
+        ALGORITHMS.A192GCM: modes.GCM,
+        ALGORITHMS.A256GCM: modes.GCM,
+        ALGORITHMS.A128CBC_HS256: modes.CBC,
+        ALGORITHMS.A192CBC_HS384: modes.CBC,
+        ALGORITHMS.A256CBC_HS512: modes.CBC,
+        ALGORITHMS.A128CBC: modes.CBC,
+        ALGORITHMS.A192CBC: modes.CBC,
+        ALGORITHMS.A256CBC: modes.CBC,
+        ALGORITHMS.A128GCMKW: modes.GCM,
+        ALGORITHMS.A192GCMKW: modes.GCM,
+        ALGORITHMS.A256GCMKW: modes.GCM,
+        ALGORITHMS.A128KW: None,
+        ALGORITHMS.A192KW: None,
+        ALGORITHMS.A256KW: None,
+    }
+
+    def __init__(self, key, algorithm):
+        if algorithm not in ALGORITHMS.AES:
+            raise JWKError("%s is not a valid AES algorithm" % algorithm)
+        if algorithm not in ALGORITHMS.SUPPORTED.union(ALGORITHMS.AES_PSEUDO):
+            raise JWKError("%s is not a supported algorithm" % algorithm)
+
+        self._algorithm = algorithm
+        self._mode = self.MODES.get(self._algorithm)
+
+        if algorithm in self.KEY_128 and len(key) != 16:
+            raise JWKError(f"Key must be 128 bit for alg {algorithm}")
+        elif algorithm in self.KEY_192 and len(key) != 24:
+            raise JWKError(f"Key must be 192 bit for alg {algorithm}")
+        elif algorithm in self.KEY_256 and len(key) != 32:
+            raise JWKError(f"Key must be 256 bit for alg {algorithm}")
+        elif algorithm in self.KEY_384 and len(key) != 48:
+            raise JWKError(f"Key must be 384 bit for alg {algorithm}")
+        elif algorithm in self.KEY_512 and len(key) != 64:
+            raise JWKError(f"Key must be 512 bit for alg {algorithm}")
+
+        self._key = key
+
+    def to_dict(self):
+        data = {"alg": self._algorithm, "kty": "oct", "k": base64url_encode(self._key)}
+        return data
+
+    def encrypt(self, plain_text, aad=None):
+        plain_text = ensure_binary(plain_text)
+        try:
+            iv = get_random_bytes(algorithms.AES.block_size // 8)
+            mode = self._mode(iv)
+            if mode.name == "GCM":
+                cipher = aead.AESGCM(self._key)
+                cipher_text_and_tag = cipher.encrypt(iv, plain_text, aad)
+                cipher_text = cipher_text_and_tag[: len(cipher_text_and_tag) - 16]
+                auth_tag = cipher_text_and_tag[-16:]
+            else:
+                cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(self._key), mode, backend=default_backend())
+                encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
+                padder = PKCS7(algorithms.AES.block_size).padder()
+                padded_data = padder.update(plain_text)
+                padded_data += padder.finalize()
+                cipher_text = encryptor.update(padded_data) + encryptor.finalize()
+                auth_tag = None
+            return iv, cipher_text, auth_tag
+        except Exception as e:
+            raise JWEError(e)
+
+    def decrypt(self, cipher_text, iv=None, aad=None, tag=None):
+        cipher_text = ensure_binary(cipher_text)
+        try:
+            iv = ensure_binary(iv)
+            mode = self._mode(iv)
+            if mode.name == "GCM":
+                if tag is None:
+                    raise ValueError("tag cannot be None")
+                cipher = aead.AESGCM(self._key)
+                cipher_text_and_tag = cipher_text + tag
+                try:
+                    plain_text = cipher.decrypt(iv, cipher_text_and_tag, aad)
+                except InvalidTag:
+                    raise JWEError("Invalid JWE Auth Tag")
+            else:
+                cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(self._key), mode, backend=default_backend())
+                decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
+                padded_plain_text = decryptor.update(cipher_text)
+                padded_plain_text += decryptor.finalize()
+                unpadder = PKCS7(algorithms.AES.block_size).unpadder()
+                plain_text = unpadder.update(padded_plain_text)
+                plain_text += unpadder.finalize()
+
+            return plain_text
+        except Exception as e:
+            raise JWEError(e)
+
+    def wrap_key(self, key_data):
+        key_data = ensure_binary(key_data)
+        cipher_text = aes_key_wrap(self._key, key_data, default_backend())
+        return cipher_text  # IV, cipher text, auth tag
+
+    def unwrap_key(self, wrapped_key):
+        wrapped_key = ensure_binary(wrapped_key)
+        try:
+            plain_text = aes_key_unwrap(self._key, wrapped_key, default_backend())
+        except InvalidUnwrap as cause:
+            raise JWEError(cause)
+        return plain_text
+
+
+class CryptographyHMACKey(Key):
+    """
+    Performs signing and verification operations using HMAC
+    and the specified hash function.
+    """
+
+    ALG_MAP = {ALGORITHMS.HS256: hashes.SHA256(), ALGORITHMS.HS384: hashes.SHA384(), ALGORITHMS.HS512: hashes.SHA512()}
+
+    def __init__(self, key, algorithm):
+        if algorithm not in ALGORITHMS.HMAC:
+            raise JWKError("hash_alg: %s is not a valid hash algorithm" % algorithm)
+        self._algorithm = algorithm
+        self._hash_alg = self.ALG_MAP.get(algorithm)
+
+        if isinstance(key, dict):
+            self.prepared_key = self._process_jwk(key)
+            return
+
+        if not isinstance(key, str) and not isinstance(key, bytes):
+            raise JWKError("Expecting a string- or bytes-formatted key.")
+
+        if isinstance(key, str):
+            key = key.encode("utf-8")
+
+        invalid_strings = [
+            b"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----",
+            b"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----",
+            b"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----",
+            b"ssh-rsa",
+        ]
+
+        if any(string_value in key for string_value in invalid_strings):
+            raise JWKError(
+                "The specified key is an asymmetric key or x509 certificate and"
+                " should not be used as an HMAC secret."
+            )
+
+        self.prepared_key = key
+
+    def _process_jwk(self, jwk_dict):
+        if not jwk_dict.get("kty") == "oct":
+            raise JWKError("Incorrect key type. Expected: 'oct', Received: %s" % jwk_dict.get("kty"))
+
+        k = jwk_dict.get("k")
+        k = k.encode("utf-8")
+        k = bytes(k)
+        k = base64url_decode(k)
+
+        return k
+
+    def to_dict(self):
+        return {
+            "alg": self._algorithm,
+            "kty": "oct",
+            "k": base64url_encode(self.prepared_key).decode("ASCII"),
+        }
+
+    def sign(self, msg):
+        msg = ensure_binary(msg)
+        h = hmac.HMAC(self.prepared_key, self._hash_alg, backend=default_backend())
+        h.update(msg)
+        signature = h.finalize()
+        return signature
+
+    def verify(self, msg, sig):
+        msg = ensure_binary(msg)
+        sig = ensure_binary(sig)
+        h = hmac.HMAC(self.prepared_key, self._hash_alg, backend=default_backend())
+        h.update(msg)
+        try:
+            h.verify(sig)
+            verified = True
+        except InvalidSignature:
+            verified = False
+        return verified

.venv/Lib/site-packages/jose/backends/ecdsa_backend.py

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+import hashlib
+
+import ecdsa
+
+from jose.backends.base import Key
+from jose.constants import ALGORITHMS
+from jose.exceptions import JWKError
+from jose.utils import base64_to_long, long_to_base64
+
+
+class ECDSAECKey(Key):
+    """
+    Performs signing and verification operations using
+    ECDSA and the specified hash function
+
+    This class requires the ecdsa package to be installed.
+
+    This is based off of the implementation in PyJWT 0.3.2
+    """
+
+    SHA256 = hashlib.sha256
+    SHA384 = hashlib.sha384
+    SHA512 = hashlib.sha512
+
+    CURVE_MAP = {
+        SHA256: ecdsa.curves.NIST256p,
+        SHA384: ecdsa.curves.NIST384p,
+        SHA512: ecdsa.curves.NIST521p,
+    }
+    CURVE_NAMES = (
+        (ecdsa.curves.NIST256p, "P-256"),
+        (ecdsa.curves.NIST384p, "P-384"),
+        (ecdsa.curves.NIST521p, "P-521"),
+    )
+
+    def __init__(self, key, algorithm):
+        if algorithm not in ALGORITHMS.EC:
+            raise JWKError("hash_alg: %s is not a valid hash algorithm" % algorithm)
+
+        self.hash_alg = {
+            ALGORITHMS.ES256: self.SHA256,
+            ALGORITHMS.ES384: self.SHA384,
+            ALGORITHMS.ES512: self.SHA512,
+        }.get(algorithm)
+        self._algorithm = algorithm
+
+        self.curve = self.CURVE_MAP.get(self.hash_alg)
+
+        if isinstance(key, (ecdsa.SigningKey, ecdsa.VerifyingKey)):
+            self.prepared_key = key
+            return
+
+        if isinstance(key, dict):
+            self.prepared_key = self._process_jwk(key)
+            return
+
+        if isinstance(key, str):
+            key = key.encode("utf-8")
+
+        if isinstance(key, bytes):
+            # Attempt to load key. We don't know if it's
+            # a Signing Key or a Verifying Key, so we try
+            # the Verifying Key first.
+            try:
+                key = ecdsa.VerifyingKey.from_pem(key)
+            except ecdsa.der.UnexpectedDER:
+                key = ecdsa.SigningKey.from_pem(key)
+            except Exception as e:
+                raise JWKError(e)
+
+            self.prepared_key = key
+            return
+
+        raise JWKError("Unable to parse an ECKey from key: %s" % key)
+
+    def _process_jwk(self, jwk_dict):
+        if not jwk_dict.get("kty") == "EC":
+            raise JWKError("Incorrect key type. Expected: 'EC', Received: %s" % jwk_dict.get("kty"))
+
+        if not all(k in jwk_dict for k in ["x", "y", "crv"]):
+            raise JWKError("Mandatory parameters are missing")
+
+        if "d" in jwk_dict:
+            # We are dealing with a private key; the secret exponent is enough
+            # to create an ecdsa key.
+            d = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("d"))
+            return ecdsa.keys.SigningKey.from_secret_exponent(d, self.curve)
+        else:
+            x = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("x"))
+            y = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("y"))
+
+            if not ecdsa.ecdsa.point_is_valid(self.curve.generator, x, y):
+                raise JWKError(f"Point: {x}, {y} is not a valid point")
+
+            point = ecdsa.ellipticcurve.Point(self.curve.curve, x, y, self.curve.order)
+            return ecdsa.keys.VerifyingKey.from_public_point(point, self.curve)
+
+    def sign(self, msg):
+        return self.prepared_key.sign(
+            msg, hashfunc=self.hash_alg, sigencode=ecdsa.util.sigencode_string, allow_truncate=False
+        )
+
+    def verify(self, msg, sig):
+        try:
+            return self.prepared_key.verify(
+                sig, msg, hashfunc=self.hash_alg, sigdecode=ecdsa.util.sigdecode_string, allow_truncate=False
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+
+    def is_public(self):
+        return isinstance(self.prepared_key, ecdsa.VerifyingKey)
+
+    def public_key(self):
+        if self.is_public():
+            return self
+        return self.__class__(self.prepared_key.get_verifying_key(), self._algorithm)
+
+    def to_pem(self):
+        return self.prepared_key.to_pem()
+
+    def to_dict(self):
+        if not self.is_public():
+            public_key = self.prepared_key.get_verifying_key()
+        else:
+            public_key = self.prepared_key
+        crv = None
+        for key, value in self.CURVE_NAMES:
+            if key == self.prepared_key.curve:
+                crv = value
+        if not crv:
+            raise KeyError(f"Can't match {self.prepared_key.curve}")
+
+        # Calculate the key size in bytes. Section 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.1.3 of
+        # RFC7518 prescribes that the 'x', 'y' and 'd' parameters of the curve
+        # points must be encoded as octed-strings of this length.
+        key_size = self.prepared_key.curve.baselen
+
+        data = {
+            "alg": self._algorithm,
+            "kty": "EC",
+            "crv": crv,
+            "x": long_to_base64(public_key.pubkey.point.x(), size=key_size).decode("ASCII"),
+            "y": long_to_base64(public_key.pubkey.point.y(), size=key_size).decode("ASCII"),
+        }
+
+        if not self.is_public():
+            data["d"] = long_to_base64(self.prepared_key.privkey.secret_multiplier, size=key_size).decode("ASCII")
+
+        return data

.venv/Lib/site-packages/jose/backends/native.py

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import os
+
+from jose.backends.base import Key
+from jose.constants import ALGORITHMS
+from jose.exceptions import JWKError
+from jose.utils import base64url_decode, base64url_encode
+
+
+def get_random_bytes(num_bytes):
+    return bytes(os.urandom(num_bytes))
+
+
+class HMACKey(Key):
+    """
+    Performs signing and verification operations using HMAC
+    and the specified hash function.
+    """
+
+    HASHES = {ALGORITHMS.HS256: hashlib.sha256, ALGORITHMS.HS384: hashlib.sha384, ALGORITHMS.HS512: hashlib.sha512}
+
+    def __init__(self, key, algorithm):
+        if algorithm not in ALGORITHMS.HMAC:
+            raise JWKError("hash_alg: %s is not a valid hash algorithm" % algorithm)
+        self._algorithm = algorithm
+        self._hash_alg = self.HASHES.get(algorithm)
+
+        if isinstance(key, dict):
+            self.prepared_key = self._process_jwk(key)
+            return
+
+        if not isinstance(key, str) and not isinstance(key, bytes):
+            raise JWKError("Expecting a string- or bytes-formatted key.")
+
+        if isinstance(key, str):
+            key = key.encode("utf-8")
+
+        invalid_strings = [
+            b"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----",
+            b"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----",
+            b"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----",
+            b"ssh-rsa",
+        ]
+
+        if any(string_value in key for string_value in invalid_strings):
+            raise JWKError(
+                "The specified key is an asymmetric key or x509 certificate and"
+                " should not be used as an HMAC secret."
+            )
+
+        self.prepared_key = key
+
+    def _process_jwk(self, jwk_dict):
+        if not jwk_dict.get("kty") == "oct":
+            raise JWKError("Incorrect key type. Expected: 'oct', Received: %s" % jwk_dict.get("kty"))
+
+        k = jwk_dict.get("k")
+        k = k.encode("utf-8")
+        k = bytes(k)
+        k = base64url_decode(k)
+
+        return k
+
+    def sign(self, msg):
+        return hmac.new(self.prepared_key, msg, self._hash_alg).digest()
+
+    def verify(self, msg, sig):
+        return hmac.compare_digest(sig, self.sign(msg))
+
+    def to_dict(self):
+        return {
+            "alg": self._algorithm,
+            "kty": "oct",
+            "k": base64url_encode(self.prepared_key).decode("ASCII"),
+        }

.venv/Lib/site-packages/jose/backends/rsa_backend.py

@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+import binascii
+import warnings
+
+import rsa as pyrsa
+import rsa.pem as pyrsa_pem
+from pyasn1.error import PyAsn1Error
+from rsa import DecryptionError
+
+from jose.backends._asn1 import (
+    rsa_private_key_pkcs1_to_pkcs8,
+    rsa_private_key_pkcs8_to_pkcs1,
+    rsa_public_key_pkcs1_to_pkcs8,
+)
+from jose.backends.base import Key
+from jose.constants import ALGORITHMS
+from jose.exceptions import JWEError, JWKError
+from jose.utils import base64_to_long, long_to_base64
+
+ALGORITHMS.SUPPORTED.remove(ALGORITHMS.RSA_OAEP)  # RSA OAEP not supported
+
+LEGACY_INVALID_PKCS8_RSA_HEADER = binascii.unhexlify(
+    "30"  # sequence
+    "8204BD"  # DER-encoded sequence contents length of 1213 bytes -- INCORRECT STATIC LENGTH
+    "020100"  # integer: 0 -- Version
+    "30"  # sequence
+    "0D"  # DER-encoded sequence contents length of 13 bytes -- PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier
+    "06092A864886F70D010101"  # OID -- rsaEncryption
+    "0500"  # NULL -- parameters
+)
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ID = binascii.unhexlify("30")
+RSA_ENCRYPTION_ASN1_OID = "1.2.840.113549.1.1.1"
+
+# Functions gcd and rsa_recover_prime_factors were copied from cryptography 1.9
+# to enable pure python rsa module to be in compliance with section 6.3.1 of RFC7518
+# which requires only private exponent (d) for private key.
+
+
+def _gcd(a, b):
+    """Calculate the Greatest Common Divisor of a and b.
+
+    Unless b==0, the result will have the same sign as b (so that when
+    b is divided by it, the result comes out positive).
+    """
+    while b:
+        a, b = b, (a % b)
+    return a
+
+
+# Controls the number of iterations rsa_recover_prime_factors will perform
+# to obtain the prime factors. Each iteration increments by 2 so the actual
+# maximum attempts is half this number.
+_MAX_RECOVERY_ATTEMPTS = 1000
+
+
+def _rsa_recover_prime_factors(n, e, d):
+    """
+    Compute factors p and q from the private exponent d. We assume that n has
+    no more than two factors. This function is adapted from code in PyCrypto.
+    """
+    # See 8.2.2(i) in Handbook of Applied Cryptography.
+    ktot = d * e - 1
+    # The quantity d*e-1 is a multiple of phi(n), even,
+    # and can be represented as t*2^s.
+    t = ktot
+    while t % 2 == 0:
+        t = t // 2
+    # Cycle through all multiplicative inverses in Zn.
+    # The algorithm is non-deterministic, but there is a 50% chance
+    # any candidate a leads to successful factoring.
+    # See "Digitalized Signatures and Public Key Functions as Intractable
+    # as Factorization", M. Rabin, 1979
+    spotted = False
+    a = 2
+    while not spotted and a < _MAX_RECOVERY_ATTEMPTS:
+        k = t
+        # Cycle through all values a^{t*2^i}=a^k
+        while k < ktot:
+            cand = pow(a, k, n)
+            # Check if a^k is a non-trivial root of unity (mod n)
+            if cand != 1 and cand != (n - 1) and pow(cand, 2, n) == 1:
+                # We have found a number such that (cand-1)(cand+1)=0 (mod n).
+                # Either of the terms divides n.
+                p = _gcd(cand + 1, n)
+                spotted = True
+                break
+            k *= 2
+        # This value was not any good... let's try another!
+        a += 2
+    if not spotted:
+        raise ValueError("Unable to compute factors p and q from exponent d.")
+    # Found !
+    q, r = divmod(n, p)
+    assert r == 0
+    p, q = sorted((p, q), reverse=True)
+    return (p, q)
+
+
+def pem_to_spki(pem, fmt="PKCS8"):
+    key = RSAKey(pem, ALGORITHMS.RS256)
+    return key.to_pem(fmt)
+
+
+def _legacy_private_key_pkcs8_to_pkcs1(pkcs8_key):
+    """Legacy RSA private key PKCS8-to-PKCS1 conversion.
+
+    .. warning::
+
+        This is incorrect parsing and only works because the legacy PKCS1-to-PKCS8
+        encoding was also incorrect.
+    """
+    # Only allow this processing if the prefix matches
+    # AND the following byte indicates an ASN1 sequence,
+    # as we would expect with the legacy encoding.
+    if not pkcs8_key.startswith(LEGACY_INVALID_PKCS8_RSA_HEADER + ASN1_SEQUENCE_ID):
+        raise ValueError("Invalid private key encoding")
+
+    return pkcs8_key[len(LEGACY_INVALID_PKCS8_RSA_HEADER) :]
+
+
+class RSAKey(Key):
+    SHA256 = "SHA-256"
+    SHA384 = "SHA-384"
+    SHA512 = "SHA-512"
+
+    def __init__(self, key, algorithm):
+        if algorithm not in ALGORITHMS.RSA:
+            raise JWKError("hash_alg: %s is not a valid hash algorithm" % algorithm)
+
+        if algorithm in ALGORITHMS.RSA_KW and algorithm != ALGORITHMS.RSA1_5:
+            raise JWKError("alg: %s is not supported by the RSA backend" % algorithm)
+
+        self.hash_alg = {
+            ALGORITHMS.RS256: self.SHA256,
+            ALGORITHMS.RS384: self.SHA384,
+            ALGORITHMS.RS512: self.SHA512,
+        }.get(algorithm)
+        self._algorithm = algorithm
+
+        if isinstance(key, dict):
+            self._prepared_key = self._process_jwk(key)
+            return
+
+        if isinstance(key, (pyrsa.PublicKey, pyrsa.PrivateKey)):
+            self._prepared_key = key
+            return
+
+        if isinstance(key, str):
+            key = key.encode("utf-8")
+
+        if isinstance(key, bytes):
+            try:
+                self._prepared_key = pyrsa.PublicKey.load_pkcs1(key)
+            except ValueError:
+                try:
+                    self._prepared_key = pyrsa.PublicKey.load_pkcs1_openssl_pem(key)
+                except ValueError:
+                    try:
+                        self._prepared_key = pyrsa.PrivateKey.load_pkcs1(key)
+                    except ValueError:
+                        try:
+                            der = pyrsa_pem.load_pem(key, b"PRIVATE KEY")
+                            try:
+                                pkcs1_key = rsa_private_key_pkcs8_to_pkcs1(der)
+                            except PyAsn1Error:
+                                # If the key was encoded using the old, invalid,
+                                # encoding then pyasn1 will throw an error attempting
+                                # to parse the key.
+                                pkcs1_key = _legacy_private_key_pkcs8_to_pkcs1(der)
+                            self._prepared_key = pyrsa.PrivateKey.load_pkcs1(pkcs1_key, format="DER")
+                        except ValueError as e:
+                            raise JWKError(e)
+            return
+        raise JWKError("Unable to parse an RSA_JWK from key: %s" % key)
+
+    def _process_jwk(self, jwk_dict):
+        if not jwk_dict.get("kty") == "RSA":
+            raise JWKError("Incorrect key type. Expected: 'RSA', Received: %s" % jwk_dict.get("kty"))
+
+        e = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("e"))
+        n = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("n"))
+
+        if "d" not in jwk_dict:
+            return pyrsa.PublicKey(e=e, n=n)
+        else:
+            d = base64_to_long(jwk_dict.get("d"))
+            extra_params = ["p", "q", "dp", "dq", "qi"]
+
+            if any(k in jwk_dict for k in extra_params):
+                # Precomputed private key parameters are available.
+                if not all(k in jwk_dict for k in extra_params):
+                    # These values must be present when 'p' is according to
+                    # Section 6.3.2 of RFC7518, so if they are not we raise
+                    # an error.
+                    raise JWKError("Precomputed private key parameters are incomplete.")
+
+                p = base64_to_long(jwk_dict["p"])
+                q = base64_to_long(jwk_dict["q"])
+                return pyrsa.PrivateKey(e=e, n=n, d=d, p=p, q=q)
+            else:
+                p, q = _rsa_recover_prime_factors(n, e, d)
+                return pyrsa.PrivateKey(n=n, e=e, d=d, p=p, q=q)
+
+    def sign(self, msg):
+        return pyrsa.sign(msg, self._prepared_key, self.hash_alg)
+
+    def verify(self, msg, sig):
+        if not self.is_public():
+            warnings.warn("Attempting to verify a message with a private key. " "This is not recommended.")
+        try:
+            pyrsa.verify(msg, sig, self._prepared_key)
+            return True
+        except pyrsa.pkcs1.VerificationError:
+            return False
+
+    def is_public(self):
+        return isinstance(self._prepared_key, pyrsa.PublicKey)
+
+    def public_key(self):
+        if isinstance(self._prepared_key, pyrsa.PublicKey):
+            return self
+        return self.__class__(pyrsa.PublicKey(n=self._prepared_key.n, e=self._prepared_key.e), self._algorithm)
+
+    def to_pem(self, pem_format="PKCS8"):
+
+        if isinstance(self._prepared_key, pyrsa.PrivateKey):
+            der = self._prepared_key.save_pkcs1(format="DER")
+            if pem_format == "PKCS8":
+                pkcs8_der = rsa_private_key_pkcs1_to_pkcs8(der)
+                pem = pyrsa_pem.save_pem(pkcs8_der, pem_marker="PRIVATE KEY")
+            elif pem_format == "PKCS1":
+                pem = pyrsa_pem.save_pem(der, pem_marker="RSA PRIVATE KEY")
+            else:
+                raise ValueError(f"Invalid pem format specified: {pem_format!r}")
+        else:
+            if pem_format == "PKCS8":
+                pkcs1_der = self._prepared_key.save_pkcs1(format="DER")
+                pkcs8_der = rsa_public_key_pkcs1_to_pkcs8(pkcs1_der)
+                pem = pyrsa_pem.save_pem(pkcs8_der, pem_marker="PUBLIC KEY")
+            elif pem_format == "PKCS1":
+                der = self._prepared_key.save_pkcs1(format="DER")
+                pem = pyrsa_pem.save_pem(der, pem_marker="RSA PUBLIC KEY")
+            else:
+                raise ValueError(f"Invalid pem format specified: {pem_format!r}")
+        return pem
+
+    def to_dict(self):
+        if not self.is_public():
+            public_key = self.public_key()._prepared_key
+        else:
+            public_key = self._prepared_key
+
+        data = {
+            "alg": self._algorithm,
+            "kty": "RSA",
+            "n": long_to_base64(public_key.n).decode("ASCII"),
+            "e": long_to_base64(public_key.e).decode("ASCII"),
+        }
+
+        if not self.is_public():
+            data.update(
+                {
+                    "d": long_to_base64(self._prepared_key.d).decode("ASCII"),
+                    "p": long_to_base64(self._prepared_key.p).decode("ASCII"),
+                    "q": long_to_base64(self._prepared_key.q).decode("ASCII"),
+                    "dp": long_to_base64(self._prepared_key.exp1).decode("ASCII"),
+                    "dq": long_to_base64(self._prepared_key.exp2).decode("ASCII"),
+                    "qi": long_to_base64(self._prepared_key.coef).decode("ASCII"),
+                }
+            )
+
+        return data
+
+    def wrap_key(self, key_data):
+        if not self.is_public():
+            warnings.warn("Attempting to encrypt a message with a private key." " This is not recommended.")
+        wrapped_key = pyrsa.encrypt(key_data, self._prepared_key)
+        return wrapped_key
+
+    def unwrap_key(self, wrapped_key):
+        try:
+            unwrapped_key = pyrsa.decrypt(wrapped_key, self._prepared_key)
+        except DecryptionError as e:
+            raise JWEError(e)
+        return unwrapped_key